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INTRODUCTION
Sovereigns have a long history of defaulting on their debts.1 Despite the
bitter lessons learned through this history, the international community has not
yet developed an effective method for dealing with these events. There is not a
single forum or mechanism that is mandated to help the debtor and all its
creditors develop a comprehensive plan for resolving its debt crisis. Instead the
debtor is usually required to negotiate in different forums with each of its
different categories of creditors. There are no formal mechanisms of
coordination between these different sets of negotiations even though their
individual outcomes are affected by what happens in the other negotiations as
each group of creditors seeks to ensure that it is not being treated unfairly by
* SARCHI Professor of International Development Law and African Economic Relations, Centre for
Human Rights, University of Pretoria, and Professor Emeritus, American University Washington
College of Law. Email: danny.bradlow@up.ac.za. The author thanks Motoko Aizawa, Juan Pablo
Bohoslavsky, Lee Buchheit, Matthias Goldmann and David Kinley for their thought-provoking
comments on an earlier draft of the paper, prepared for the 2016 Society of International Economic Law
conference. Needless to say, they are not responsible for the conclusions that the author has drawn from
their comments. The author also thanks Nthope Mapefane for her research assistance.
1.
CARMEN M. REINHART AND KENNETH ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT
CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY (2009).
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the debtor. As a result, each sovereign’s debt restructuring process is likely to
be conflict ridden, inefficient and to have a high probability of resulting in a
sub-optimal outcome. In fact, the risk of sub-optimal outcomes has increased as
financial markets have become larger and more globalized so that sovereign
debtors—at least those with access to financial markets – are able to borrow
from a broader range of creditors.
One consequence is that sovereign debt restructurings (SODRs), as can be
seen from the cases of Greece2 and Argentina,3 are difficult, often traumatic,
experiences for the sovereign debtors and their populations and frustrating and
potentially costly for their creditors. It is invariably the case that in a SODR,
the sovereign, because it either has lost access to financing or can only obtain it
on more expensive terms, will be forced to reduce its expenditures in order to
try and meet its existing debt obligations. This means that it is entirely
foreseeable that the sovereign’s debt problems will have a range of adverse
economic, social and political impacts4 in the debtor country. It is also likely
that the creditors will suffer financial losses due to the costs associated with the
renegotiation of their credit transactions with a sovereign borrower in
difficulty. There may also be losses associated with the delayed or reduced
interest payments, and possibly reduced principle repayments that result from
the SODR.
The SODR therefore carries a high risk of having adverse human rights
impacts on at least some of the stakeholders in the SODR. These impacts can
include less access to health services, education services and other social
services as funding for these services are reduced; loss of access to justice as
spending on police, courts and legal services are cut; and job losses.5 On the
creditor side, depending on the size of the loss and the identity of the ultimate
holders of the debt, the SODR can result in job losses for the creditor’s
employees or the loss of savings and income for pensioners and other
bondholders of modest means.6 The net effect of these potential impacts is that
2.
Truth Committee on Greek Public Debt: Preliminary Report (June 18, 2015), available at
http://cadtm.org/Preliminary-Report-of-the-Truth; Margot E. Salomon & Olivier De Schutter, Economic
Policy Conditionality, Socio-Economic Rights and International Legal Responsibility: The Case of
Greece 2010-2015 (Legal Brief prepared for the Special Committee of the Hellenic Parliament on the
audit of the Greek Debt, 2015); U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent Expert on the
effects of foreign debt and other related international financial obligations of States on the full
enjoyment of all human rights, particularly economic, social and cultural rights on his mission to
Greece, A/HRC/31/60/Add.2 (Feb 29, 2016).
3.
Brad Setser & Anna Gelpern, Pathways Through Financial Crisis: Argentina, 1 GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE: A REVIEW OF MULTILATERALISM AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 465 (2006).
4.
Sovereign debt crises also can have substantial adverse environmental and social effects.
However since the focus of this article is on the human rights impacts of these crises, the environmental
consequences will not be discussed. It should be noted, however, that these environmental consequences
can have human rights implications and to this extent fall within the ambit of this article.
5.
Truth Committee on Greek Public Debt, supra note 2; The Inspection Panel Report on
ARGENTINA–SEGBA V Power Distribution Project (Loan No. 2854 – AR), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/Resources/ParaguayEligibilityReportwan
nexes.pdf; ECtHR: Koufaki and Adedy v Greece, Appl. Nos. 57665/12 57657/12, available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/app/conversion/pdf/?library=ECHR&id=002-7627&filename=002-7627.pdf;
Abaclat et al. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID case number ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and
Admissibility (Aug 4, 2011), available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0236.pdf.
6.
Jessica Beess und Chrostin, Sovereign Debt Restructuring and Mass Claims Arbitration
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SODRs will involve a struggle between the debtor and its creditors and
amongst the different stakeholders on both the creditor and debtor sides to
avoid having to bear more than their fair (as they define it) share of the
financial losses and to mitigate the economic, financial, social, human rights
and political consequences of the SODR.
Given these high stakes, it is not surprising that efforts have been made
over the past 70 years to improve the process. One recent manifestation of this
effort has been the promulgation of a number of international norms and
standards that either explicitly or implicitly are applicable to SODRs. These
include norms and standards that are expressly designed to improve the
efficiency of the sovereign debt negotiation and renegotiation processes such as
the Institute for International Finance’s (IIF),7 “Principles for Stable Capital
Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring in Emerging Markets”, and the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s (UNCTAD) “Principles on
Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing”,8 and “Sovereign Debt
Workouts: Roadmap and Guide” (Roadmap)9 and the UN’s Guiding Principles
on Foreign Debt and Human Rights.10
Interestingly, the documents dealing with the SODR process all recognize
that SODRs have substantial social and political effects in addition to their
financial and economic consequences. In fact, they all appear to accept that the
parties to the SODR will need to take these impacts into account in arranging a
sustainable SODR. However, they do not provide detailed guidance to the
parties on how they should deal with these social and political impacts in
negotiating and agreeing on a sustainable SODR. Except for the UN Guiding
Principles on Foreign Debt and Human Rights and the UNCTAD Roadmap,
which does so briefly, they do not discuss the human rights impacts of SODRs.
This is surprising given the norms and standards that companies and states have
developed for dealing with the social responsibilities, including in regard to
human rights, of businesses. These norms and standards include the UN’s
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs),11 the Global
before the ICSID: The Abaclat Case, 53 HARV. INT’L LJ 505 (2012); Stacie I. Strong, Rogue Debtors
and Unanticipated Risk, 35 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1139 (2013).
7.
Institute of International Finance, Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt
Restructuring
in
Emerging
Markets
(March
31,
2005),
available
at
https://www.iif.com/topics/principles-stable-capital-flows-and-fair-debt-restructuring;
Institute
of
International Finance, PCG Report on Implementation of the Principles (2015), available at
https://www.iif.com/news/capital-markets-and-emerging-markets-policy/2013-pcg-report-implementationprinciples. See infra notes 34-38 and accompanying text for discussion of these Principles.
8.
UNCTAD, Principles on Promoting Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing,
UNCTAD/GDS/DDF/2012/Misc.1
(Jan
10,
2012),
available
at
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/gdsddf2012misc1_en.pdf. See infra notes 39-50 and
accompanying text for discussion of these Principles.
9.
UNCTAD, Sovereign Debt Workouts: Going Forward. Roadmap and Guide (2015),
available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/gdsddf2015misc1_en.pdf; see infra notes 51-56
and accompanying text for discussion of the Roadmap.
10. Annex to Resolution 20/10 of the U.N. Human Rights Council, The Effects of Foreign
Debt and Other Related International Financial Obligations of States on the Full Enjoyment of All
Human Rights, particularly Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/20/10 (July
18, 2012).
11. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, GUIDING
PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, U.N. DOC. HR/PUB/11/04, available at
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf.
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Compact,12 the OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises13 and ISO
26000.14
The seeming disconnect between the developments related to the SODR
process and to business and human rights is intriguing, particularly because
many of the world’s most significant financial institutions have publically
available human rights policies that, at least prima facie, are applicable to all
their business operations and relations.15 Moreover, given the scope of their
operations, they are likely to be creditors in at least some SODRs. In addition,
the human rights implications of SODRs are sufficiently predictable, profound
and adverse that one would expect that these institutions, if they take their own
human rights policies seriously, would try and ensure that the SODRs in which
they participate conform to their own human rights policies and to the
international standards dealing with human rights and business, which are often
referenced in those policies.
The disconnect between these two developments raises at least two
questions. First, should the human rights and business standards be applied to
the SODR process. Second, if they should be applied to the SODR process,
how should they be applied?
The primary purpose of this article is to answer these two questions. This
exercise serves three purposes. First, it will enable us to see if these human
rights and business standards can add value to SODRs in the sense of reducing
their human rights costs without unduly increasing their financial costs. Second
it will provide some additional insight into how easily human rights law can be
adapted to financial transactions specifically and to business more generally.
Third, this exercise might help us better understand how to plug the gap in
global economic governance that allows different actors in global governance
to develop international standards on SODR and on business and human rights
on parallel tracks that do not seem to communicate with each other.
The consideration of these issues leads to three conclusions. First, SODRs
would benefit from the incorporation of business and human rights standards.
These standards would help SODRs reach outcomes that produce fewer and/or less
severe adverse human rights impacts. This, in turn, should improve the legitimacy
of the SODR outcome, thereby facilitating its implementation and enhancing its
sustainability to the benefit of all parties to the SODR. Second the application of
the UNGPs to SODRs indicates that the subject of business and human rights
poses a challenge for human rights law. The reason is that the way in which
human rights issues arise in the business context is often different from the way
in which they arise in the relationship between the state and its citizens. As a
12. U.N. Global Compact, The Ten Principles of the Global Compact (Jan 31, 1999), available
at https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles, see infra notes 83-88 and
accompanying text for discussion of the Global Compact.
13. OECD, Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (May 25, 2011), available at
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/48004323.pdf, see infra note 82 and accompanying text for discussion
of these Guidelines.
14. ISO 26000 Guidance to Social Responsibility (Nov 1, 2010), available at
https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso:26000:ed-1:v1:en, see infra note 89-91 and accompanying text
for discussion of ISO 26000.
15. See, infra, notes 100-109 and accompanying text for discussion of the human rights
policies of the major international banks.
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result, the jurisprudence on the application of human rights principles in the
latter context cannot simply be transposed without adjustments into the former
context. However, we do not yet have the knowledge or experience to fully
understand the nature and type of adjustments that are needed for this
transposition to be effective. Third, the article will conclude that the lack of
coordination between the international standards applicable to SODRs and
those applicable to the human rights responsibilities of creditors is a symptom
of a coordination problem in global economic governance. One consequence of
which is an over-emphasis on financial and economic considerations in
complex financial transactions like SODRs.
In order to make this case, this article is divided into five sections. The
first section will provide a brief overview of the key characteristics of the
SODR process that are relevant to understanding the human rights impacts of
these transactions. The second section will describe the various international
norms and standards applicable to SODRs. The third section will describe the
primary international standards applicable to the issue of business and human
rights. The fourth section will consider the applicability of the UNGPs to
SODRs. The final section is the conclusion.
I. SOME RELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING THE SODR PROCESS
The purpose of this paper is to focus on how sovereign debtors and
financial institutions that extend credit to them currently deal with human rights
issues in SODRs. It is not to give a comprehensive overview of SODRs.16 In
order to place the issue of SODR’s human rights impacts in context, the focus
of this section is on the planning and negotiating process in SODRs. It will not
discuss in any detail the role that international financial institutions like the
IMF or bilateral creditors play in the SODR process,17 the many financial and
economic factors that may influence the ultimate results of the SODR process
or the many important contractual issues that can arise in SODRs.18
In order to place the points made below in context it is useful to give a
brief overview of the current approach to the SODR process. The usual SODR
involves a number of different debtor-creditor negotiations. The debtor will
negotiate with its official bilateral creditors in the Paris Club, an informal
forum, housed within the French Treasury.19 It is possible that there may be
16. See generally SOVEREIGN DEBT MANAGEMENT (Rosa M. Lastra and Lee C. Buccheit eds.,
2014) (providing an overview of the legal and other issues involved in SODRs).
17. It should be noted that the multilateral development banks and bilateral official creditors
can be important actors in many SODRs, particularly in the case of low income countries.
18. Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Bankruptcy Reorganization
Approach, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 956 (2000); Matthias Goldmann, Human Rights and Sovereign Debt
Workouts, in MAKING SOVEREIGN FINANCING AND HUMAN RIGHTS WORK 79 (Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky
& J. Letnar Cernic eds., 2014); Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring Options: An
Analytical Comparison, 2 HARV. BUSINESS L. REV. (2012); Francois Gianviti et al., A European
Mechanism for Sovereign Debt Crisis Resolution: A Proposal, BRUEGEL BLUEPRINT SERIES (2010),
available
at
http://bruegel.org/wpcontent/uploads/imported/publications/101109_BP_as_jpf_jvh_A_European
_mechanism_for_sovereign_debt_crisis_resolution_a_proposal.pdf.
19. The Paris Club, which is informal in the sense that it has no independent legal identity, is a
grouping of official creditors who meet with sovereign debtors in difficulty to renegotiate their debts to
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some official creditors who are not part of the Paris Club and with whom the
debtor will need to negotiate separately.
The sovereign debtor will negotiate with its commercial creditors in one
or more forums.20 For example, it may negotiate with its bond holders in one
forum, often informally referred to as “the London Club”, its commercial bank
creditors in a separate forum and with companies to whom it has outstanding
debts on goods and services that it has purchased or to whom it owes payments
for items such as royalties or dividends in another forum, in which the various
companies either participate collectively or in sub-groups or it may negotiate
with them individually. The creditors in these different forums are likely to
seek to ensure, at least to the extent of their bargaining power, that the debtor
treats them all more or less equivalently.21 It is also possible that the
agreements reached in some of these negotiating forums are not comprehensive
in the sense that not all creditors eligible to participate in the particular forum
sign the agreement reached in that forum. In this case, the debtor can be forced
into a second set of negotiations, or, for example as happened in Argentina,22
into litigation with these disgruntled creditors. In most circumstances the
multilateral official creditors of the debtor, such as the multilateral
development banks or the International Monetary Fund, do not participate as
creditors in the SODR.23 The reason for this is that by custom they have
preferred creditor status and so their debts are not included in the SODR.24
Their contribution to the SODR process typically is to provide financial and
technical support to the sovereign debtor during the SODR.
these official creditors. The creditors and the debtor agree, in an Agreed Minute, on the general terms on
which all qualifying official debts shall be renegotiated. Each official creditor then concludes its own
bilateral agreement with the sovereign debtor based on the terms in the Agreed Minute. There are
currently 20 countries whose official financial agencies, such as their export credit agencies and their aid
agencies, participate as permanent participants in the Paris Club. Other countries and their agencies can
participate on an ad hoc basis in the negotiations for a particular debtor country. See generally
http://www.clubdeparis.org; MARTIN A. WEISS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21482, THE PARIS CLUB
AND INTERNATIONAL DEBT RELIEF (2004); THOMAS CALLAGHY, INNOVATION IN THE SOVEREIGN DEBT
REGIME: FROM THE PARIS CLUB TO ENHANCED HIPC AND BEYOND (2004).
20. Raman Uppal & Cynthia Van Hulle, Sovereign Debt and the London Club: A
Precommitment Device for Limiting Punishment for Default, 21 JOURNAL OF BANKING & FINANCE 741
(1997); Giovanni Vitale, Multilateral Sovereign Debt Restructuring: the Paris Club and the London
Club, in CRISIS? WHAT CRISIS? ORDERLY WORKOUT FORS SOVEREIGN DEBTORS 122 (Barry
Eichengreen & Richard Portes eds., 1995); Udaibir Das, Michael G. Papaioannou & Christoph
Trebesch, Sovereign Debt Restructurings 1950-2010: Literature Survey, Data, and Stylized Facts
(International Monetary Fund Working Paper WP/12/203, 2012).
21. SOVEREIGN DEBT MANAGEMENT, supra note 16; Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati,
Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will, 51 EMORY L. J. 1317 (2002); Lee C. Buchheit & Jeremiah S.
Pam, The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments, 53 EMORY L. J. 869 (2004); Gregory
Makoff & Robert Kahn, Sovereign Bond Reform – Implementing the New ICMA Pari Passu and
Collective
Action
Clause
(CIGI
Papers,
2015),
available
at
https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/cigi_paper_no_56.pdf.
22. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Argentina, No. 08 Civ 6978 (TPG) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2012)
(granting preliminary injunction); NML Capital, Ltd. V. Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 264 (2d Cir. 2012);
NML Capital, Ltd. v. Argentina, No. 08 Civ 6978 (TPG), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167272 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 21, 2012); Elliott Associates, L.P. v. Republic of Peru 12 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
23. Emine Boz, Sovereign Default, Private Sector Creditors, and the IFIs, 83 J. OF INT’L
ECONOMICS 70 (2011). It should be noted that there have been occasions, for example during the HIPC
initiative, in which these institutions did agree to participate as creditors and to reduce the debt owed to
them by their sovereign borrowers.
24. William Wilson Bratton & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Debt Restructuring and the Best
Interest of Creditors, 57 VANDERBILT L. REV. 1 (2010).
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There are a few points that need to be highlighted in order to understand
the treatment of human rights issues in the SODR process:
First, the creditors maintain that the sovereign freely assumed its debt
obligations and promised to meet all its promises in regard to repayment. The
fact that it is no longer living up to its promises, particularly when it has
financial resources available,25 is a choice for which it and its citizens must
accept the consequences. From the creditors’ position, this is not unfair because
the debtor broke its promise to repay and there is no reason why the creditor
and its stakeholders should have to bear the cost of this breach of its
obligations. On the other hand, the citizens of the debtor country may contend
that they were not expressly consulted by their government about the debts and
the risks associated with taking on those debts. Consequently, they may not
understand why they, rather than the creditors who did assume the risks
associated with making the loan, should be expected to make sacrifices in order
to meet the demands of the creditors.
Second, as indicated above, there is no formal independent mechanism
that sovereign borrowers and their financial institution creditors can utilize
during a SODR. This means that there is no third party entity that can help the
sovereign debtor and the creditors reach a mutually acceptable agreement and
then monitor and enforce the SODR.26 Instead, the parties have to form and
manage their own negotiating forums. Thus, the overall outcome of the
negotiations in each of these forums and of the overall SODR is likely to
depend on the relative bargaining power of the parties and their need to reach
an agreement without any offsetting third party to try and ensure some balance
in the negotiations. The uncertainty resulting from the sovereign’s inability to
fully service its debts gives both parties an incentive to reach agreement as
quickly as possible. However, normally the sovereign has a greater need to
resolve its situation than its creditors. This reality tilts the balance of bargaining
power, in most SODRs, in favor of the creditors.27
25. In most cases the sovereign debtor will have some financial resources, although not
enough to meet all its financial commitments. Consequently, the creditors will contend that the decision
not to meet its debt obligation is a choice in the sense that it is deciding to allocate its funds for purposes
other than debt servicing.
26. The international community has periodically attempted to establish such a third party
mechanism. See generally, Martin Guzman, José A. Ocampo & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Creating a
Framework for Sovereign Debt Restructuring that Works, in TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE: THE QUEST TO
RESOLVE SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISES (Martin Guzman et al. eds., 2016). There have been two such efforts
this century. See Eric Helleiner, The Mystery of the Missing Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism,
27 CONTRIBUTIONS TO POLITICAL ECONOMY 91-113 (2008). In the early 2000s, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) explored the feasibility of creating a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism and
concluded that it was not possible. See Anne O. Kreuger, A New Approach to Sovereign Debt
Restructuring (IMF, 2002), avaiable at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/sdrm/eng/sdrm.pdf.
More recently, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution calling for the creation of such
a mechanism. This effort has resulted in a set of U.N. principles to guide the structuring of such a
mechanism and a working group to consider its creation but not in an actual agreement to establish such
a
mechanism.
See
G.A.
Res.
69/319
(Sept.
29,
2015),
available
at
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/69/319.
27. The IMF has indicated that in some cases it will be willing to lend into arrears, which may
restore some balance to the distribution of bargaining power. See generally, IMF, Policy on Lending into
Arrears
to
Private
Creditors
(June
14,
1999),
available
at
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/privcred/lending.pdf; IMF, Fund Policy on Lending into Arrears to
Private Creditors—Further Consideration of the Good Faith Criterion (July 30, 2002), available at
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In light of the failure to reach agreement on the establishment of a formal
independent sovereign debt restructuring mechanism,28 the international
community has used two different approaches, which are not mutually
exclusive, to try and improve the SODR process. One strategy has been to
adjust the contractual arrangements between debtors and creditors so that they
provide for more efficient SODRs. The primary fruits of these efforts are the
incorporation of collective action clauses and revised pari passu clauses in
sovereign debt financing agreements.29 The collective action clauses make it
harder for small groups of recalcitrant creditors to block SODR agreements
between the debtors and creditors. The revised pari passu clauses are intended
to reduce the chances for success of claims like those made by the hold out
creditors in the Argentinian litigation.30 The second approach has been to
develop standards that are designed to establish more efficient ground rules for
the negotiation and renegotiation of sovereign debt. This second approach is
discussed in detail in the next section of this paper.
Third, the balance of bargaining power is also affected by the fact that
both parties understand that the borrower’s situation is likely to continue
deteriorating until an agreement is reached. Consequently, delay in reaching an
agreement may increase the potential costs of the SODR to both creditors and
debtor. This places both parties under time pressure and it inevitably means that
any requirement that the parties collect new data in order to gain new insights
and a better understanding of the borrower’s situation has a cost for all
stakeholders in the SODR. It thus creates a disincentive for the parties to add
new steps to the SODR process, even if they do result in a more informed
SODR outcome.
Fourth, by definition, in a SODR, the sovereign debtor does not have
enough financing to meet all its financial commitments.31 This does not
necessarily mean that the sovereign has no foreign exchange. In fact, in most
cases the sovereign will have access to some financing but probably not enough
to meet all its commitments to its citizens and its creditors. The result is that it

https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/privcred/073002.pdf; IMF, Sovereign Debt Restructuring – recent
developments and implications for the fund’s legal and policy framework (Apr 26, 2013), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/042613.pdf.
28. See supra note 26.
29. Lee C. Buchheit et al., supra note 21; Skylar Brooks & Domenico Lombardi, Governing
Sovereign Debt Restructuring Through Regulatory Standards, 6 JOURNAL OF GLOBALIZATION AND
DEVELOPMENT 287 (2016); Roberto Blanco, Simon Brennan & Ian W. Marsh, An Empirical Analysis of
the Dynamic Relation between Investment Grade Bonds and Credit Default Swaps, 60 THE JOURNAL OF
FINANCE 2255 (2005); Lee C. Buchheit & Jeremiah S. Pam, supra note 21.
30. See supra note 22.
31. The tight constraints within which the sovereign has to make these choices are loosened to
the extent that it can obtain foreign exchange from international financial institutions such as the IMF
and the MDBs. However, these resources come at a price. The price is paid partially in terms of the
conditionalities that the IFIs attach to their funding, which, in turn, impact on the sovereign’s choices in
how to allocate its foreign exchange. Once again these choices have social and human rights impacts.
The issue of the IFI’s human rights responsibilities is outside the scope of this paper but see, e.g., Daniel
D. Bradlow, World Bank, the IMF, and Human Rights 6 TRANSNATIONAL LAW AND CONTEMPORARY
PROBLEMS 47 (1996); MAC DARROW, BETWEEN LIGHT AND SHADOW: THE WORLD BANK, THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2003). See generally,
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS & INTERNATIONAL LAW (Daniel D. Bradlow & David B.
Hunter eds., 2010).
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must make choices about how to allocate its available funds. These choices
inevitably have human rights impacts that raise challenges for the sovereign’s
own human rights obligations. To the extent that the choices are influenced by
negotiations with the creditors, these choices will also have implications for the
human rights responsibilities of the commercial creditors.
Historically, all the parties to the SODR process have maintained, at least
in a formal sense, that the decision of how to allocate the sovereign’s limited
financial resources is the prerogative of the sovereign debtor. This decision is
perceived to relate to its responsibilities as a sovereign and it is a decision for
which it is accountable to its citizens. The commercial creditors should respect
the decision regardless of whether they think it is a wise decision or is
consistent with the human rights obligations of the borrower.32 This follows
from the creditors’ obligation to obey all the applicable law in the debtor state
and to respect its sovereignty. Within the constraints of these obligations, the
creditors are free to negotiate any SODR with the borrower that they deem
acceptable.
Given the realities of the balance of bargaining power between the parties
in an SODR, it is not tenable to maintain that this decision is purely a sovereign
prerogative. The outcome of the debt renegotiation is a mutually bargained and
agreed arrangement, in which both parties, in fact, have little choice other than
to reach some sort of agreement. Moreover since the choice of how the
sovereign allocates its limited foreign exchange has implications for the success
of the SODR, it is not credible to maintain that the creditors merely passively
accept the decision of the debtor and try to negotiate for the best possible deal
within the constraints of this sovereign decision. Their negotiating strategy
inevitably and intentionally influences the sovereign’s decision on how it
allocates its limited foreign exchange. This suggests that the responsibilities for
the human rights impacts of the agreement should be attributed to both parties.
It is not reasonable for the financial institutions to place all the responsibility
for the human rights impacts of the agreement on the borrower. This is
particularly the case when the creditors are able to block the sovereign debtor’s
access to international financial markets until an agreement is reached.
Fifth, historically the commercial creditors have used their bargaining
power to exclude certain concerns of the sovereign from the ambit of the
negotiations. For example, the creditors might not accept as relevant to their
SODR negotiations claims by the sovereign that its responsibilities to provide
their citizens with adequate food and medicine imports should have a higher
priority than payment of commercial creditors.33 This view, as long as it can be
enforced by the creditors through their bargaining power, can result in the
creditors demanding and receiving a larger share of the available foreign
exchange than would have been the case if these other issues had been treated
32. See generally, Daniel D. Bradlow, Differing Conceptions of Development and the Content
of International Development Law, 21 SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (2005); Robert
McCorquodale & Penelope Simons, Responsibility Beyond Borders: State Responsibility for
Extraterritorial Violations by Corporations of International Human Rights Law, 70 THE MODERN LAW
REVIEW 598 (2007).
33. Julius Nyerere, “Should we really let our people starve so we can pay our debts?” THE
GUARDIAN, Mar. 21, 1985.
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as valid considerations within the context of the SODR negotiations. The result
can be to exacerbate the adverse human rights impacts of the SODR agreement.
Sixth, the creditors often argue that, while they understand that the
proposed SODR outcome will cause the sovereign and its citizens pain, the
situation would be worse if the sovereign does not pay them what they are
asking. The reason is that, in the absence of the proposed agreement, the
sovereign risks being frozen out of international financial markets for an
unduly long period of time. Ultimately, they contend, this will cause the pain of
the SODR to last for a longer period and to affect more people, than would
otherwise have been the case. In short, they argue, at least by implication, that
although the deal they are offering is painful for the sovereign and its subjects it
will cause fewer and smaller adverse human rights impacts over time than will
the more generous deal the sovereign is demanding.
The validity of the creditors’ argument depends on a range of
assumptions about how financial markets and the other stakeholders in the
SODR will react if the creditors’ proposals are adopted. In principle it is
possible for the parties to assess the potential consequences of the creditors’
proposals and their impacts on the various stakeholders in the SODR. However,
it is not easy to do so, particularly when the assessments must be done under
time pressure. This means that any ex ante assessments are likely to be based
on imperfect and incomplete information.
Seventh, the SODR will be complicated by the fact that there is a
bargaining process that takes place among the different stakeholders on the
debtor side. In this process, for example, the different stakeholders in the debtor
society will bargain with each other and the state over how to allocate the costs
of the SODR. The most likely outcome of this process is that the more
powerful stakeholders in the debtor state will use their power and influence to
minimize the adjustment burden that they have to bear and to shift the burden
onto weaker, and usually poorer stakeholders. This increases the likelihood that
the SODR will have substantial adverse human rights consequences.
Given the stakes in these internal negotiations, all the domestic
stakeholders are likely to use whatever allies they have both within the debtor
state and among other stakeholders in the SODR to improve their bargaining
positions. The various groups of creditors risk being drawn into this domestic
negotiation and, regardless of their responses, having an impact on the outcome
of the domestic negotiations and thereby on the overall SODR outcome. This
suggests that the historical view that the decision on how to allocate the pain of
the SODR decision is purely the prerogative of the sovereign, at best, elevates
form over substance. The creditors will inevitably exert influence over these
decisions, regardless of how well they may camouflage this reality behind legal
formalities.
This raises the question of what consequences should follow from the fact
that they are implicated in the decision. Increasingly, the international
community is indicating that it expects the commercial creditors to behave
responsibly, including in human right terms, in their lending decisions. The
international community has developed one set of standards for guiding
financial institutions in regard to their conduct in the SODR process and
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another set in regard to their responsibilities for the human rights impacts of
their transactions. These two sets of standards are discussed in the next two
sections of the paper.
II. INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO SOVEREIGN DEBT
WORKOUTS
The most significant international standard specifically dealing with
SODRs, given that most of the major international banks are members of the
IIF34 and are creditors in sovereign debt transactions, is the IIF’s Principles for
Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring in Emerging Markets.35 This
document seeks to establish SODR processes that are based on “. . . shared
information, are conducted in good faith, and seek to achieve a fair outcome for
all parties”.36 It stipulates four principles that should guide the SODR—
transparency and timely flow of information, close debtor-creditor dialogue and
cooperation to avoid restructuring, good faith actions, and fair treatment.37 The
IIF’s elaboration on these principles states that the debtor should implement
policies that promote macro-economic stability, sustainable growth and market
confidence, that the SODR is a voluntary process of good faith negotiations
that should respect the sanctity of contract, and that the debtor should avoid
discriminating among its creditors. The IIF contends that a process based on its
principles maximizes the likelihood that the debtor will regain market access
“as soon as possible under sustainable macroeconomic conditions”.38 It is
important to note that the Principles include no reference to the responsibilities
of the creditors to respect the human rights of the citizens of the debtor country.
In fact, the Principles do not suggest that the creditors have any responsibility
to take the likely impact of their actions on these citizens into account in their
negotiating and decision making process.
Another applicable standard is UNCTAD’s Principles on Responsible
Borrowing and Lending. 39 These principles seek to offer guidance to both
sovereign borrowers and their creditors on how they can behave responsibly in
both planning and implementing their financial transactions. They make clear
that the sovereign debtor and its creditors share responsibility for ensuring that
the sovereign’s debts are sustainable.40 The UNCTAD Principles stipulate, inter
alia, that the lender should recognize that the government officials involved in
sovereign borrowing have a responsibility to protect the public interest;41 that
the lender should make a realistic assessment of the borrower’s capacity to
service the loan based on the best available information and due diligence;42
34. According to the IIF’s website, “[t]he Institute of International Finance is the global
association of the financial industry, with close to 500 members from 70 countries.” Available at:
https://www.iif.com/about (last visited April 14, 2016).
35. Supra note 7.
36. Id., Principle 11.
37. Id.,13-16.
38. Id., 11.
39. UNCTAD, supra note 8.
40. Id., see Preamble at 4.
41. Id., Lender Principle 1.
42. Id., Lender Principle 4.
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and that any debt restructurings should be based on good faith and a
cooperative spirit to reach a consensual arrangement as quickly as is feasible.43
The lenders also have a responsibility, in the specific context of project
financing to conduct adequate social and environmental impact assessments
that are proportional to the technical expertise of the lender and the size of the
debt.44
The UNCTAD Principles stipulate that sovereign borrowers have
complimentary responsibilities. Thus, governments have a responsibility to
protect the interests of their citizens in their financial transactions;45 they
should honor their financial obligations;46 they should be transparent in their
obligations, including to their own citizens;47 they should avoid over-borrowing
and should manage their debts responsibly48 and debt restructurings should be
undertaken promptly, efficiently and fairly.49 In the specific case of project
finance, sovereign borrowers also have an obligation to undertake ex ante
social and environmental impact assessments and should make their results
public.50 It is interesting to note that these Principles do not explicitly make
reference to either the human rights obligations of the sovereign borrower or to
the human rights responsibilities of the lenders.
UNCTAD has also issued the Roadmap for sovereign debt workouts.51 It
provides an overview of the shortcomings with the current SODR
arrangements, a set of principles to guide SODRs, and recommendations on
how the SODR process can be reformed. In its discussion of the short-comings
with the current process it highlights the fragmented and uncoordinated nature
of the current process, the fact that the process cannot guarantee a fair outcome
for either the debtor or its creditors and that the process is inefficient and may
result in an outcome that is “too little too late”. It suggests furthermore that the
process could be improved if it was based on a common set of principles.52
These would ensure that the process is legitimate, impartial, transparent,
conducted in good faith, and aimed at producing a sustainable outcome.53
Importantly a sustainable outcome is defined as one that is based on a SODR
process that is efficient, produces a debt situation that does not “lead to
violations of economic or social rights or prevent the attainment of
internationally agreed development goals”.54 The Roadmap’s concern with
human rights is indicated in Section 4 of the document, which deals with
restructuring terms and post-restructuring issues. In its discussion of its
recommendations regarding sustainability, the Roadmap states that

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id., Lender Principle 7.
Id., Lender Principle 5.
Id., Borrower Principle 8.
Id., Borrower Principle 9.
Id., Borrower Principles 10 and 11.
Id., Borrower Principles 13 and 14.
Id., Borrower Principle 15.
Id., Borrower Principle 12.
UNCTAD, supra note 9.
Id., Section 3: The Sovereign Debt Workout Principles 19-24.
Id.
UNCTAD, supra note 9, Principle 5 at 24.
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sustainability is a holistic concept and thus “requires going beyond merely
economic considerations” and stipulates that “[r]espect for human rights,
particularly socio-economic rights, and political risks need to be taken into
account”.55 In addition, the Roadmap, in its recommendations for dealing with
uncooperative creditors, suggests that the debtor should not agree to any terms
that would violate the “economic and social rights of citizens in the debtor
state”.56
It is important to note that the Roadmap provides no guidance on how the
parties should implement these recommendations on human rights. In addition,
the Roadmap focuses on social and economic rights and does not specifically
discuss civil, political and cultural rights. It also makes no specific reference to
any international human rights treaties. This is noteworthy because the
international instruments dealing with business and human rights make clear
that the responsibilities of businesses extend to all human rights and are not
limited to specific categories of rights. This observation is also applicable to
SODRs which, like any business transaction, can implicate the full range of
human rights. Finally, it should be noted that the Roadmap, even though it was
issued in 2015, makes no reference to the UNGPs.
In 2011, the United Nations Human Rights Council endorsed the Guiding
Principles on Foreign Debt and Human Rights (HRC Guiding Principles).57
These principles are designed to balance the contractual obligations of debtors
and creditors arising from their external debt arrangements and their obligations
to respect human rights.58 The HRC Guiding Principles establish foundational
principles for dealing with foreign debt and human rights that include the
following:59
• ensuring the primacy of human rights—all states have the
obligation to respect, protect and fulfill the human rights of their
populations and all private corporations have the responsibility to
respect human rights;
• equality and non-discrimination—states have an obligation to
design and implement policies and programs that promote a
“more equitable and non-discriminatory distribution of benefits. .
.”60 and should conduct impact analyses to promote this
principle, particularly in regard to vulnerable groups in society;61
• progressive realization of rights—states are obliged to ensure that
their external debt arrangements “do not hinder the progressive
realization” of human rights and non-state lenders must ensure

55. UNCTAD, supra note 9, at 54.
56. Id., at 59.
57. U.N. Human Rights Council: Guiding principles on foreign debt and human rights,
annexed to the Report of the Independent Expert on the effects of foreign debt and other related
international financial obligations of States on the full enjoyment of all human rights, particularly
economic, social and cultural rights, Cephas Lumina, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/20/23 (April 10, 2011).
58. Id., Section 1 paragraph 2.
59. Id., Section II.
60. Id., paragraph 12.
61. Id., paragraphs 11-14.
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that their debt contracts with states respect human rights;62
• minimum core obligations—states must ensure that their external
debt obligations do not derogate from their obligations to provide
“minimum essential levels of economic social and cultural
rights;63
• non-retrogression—states should ensure that their external debt
repayment obligations do not lead to them adopting measures
that impair advancements of economic social and cultural
rights.64
The HRC Guiding Principles also include a set of operational principles,
which require the state to conduct a participatory and transparent needs
assessment before borrowing and suggest that the lenders should conduct due
diligence to ensure that the loan to the state will be used for a public purpose
and will not lead to unsustainable debt servicing obligations for the state.65 The
principles also specify that the key terms of loan agreements should be publicly
disclosed by both the borrower and the lenders66 and that the debtor state
should ensure that its debt servicing obligations are not so burdensome that
they cause the diversion of states resources away from the realization of human
rights.67 In regard to sovereign debtors in difficulty, the HRC Guiding
Principles stipulate that, while the debtor state should honor its “legitimate”
external debt obligations,68 it should renegotiate these obligations with the aim
of reaching an agreement that “enables the debtor state to service its external
debt without compromising its capacity to fulfill its international human rights
obligations [. . .]”.69
Two points should be noted about the HRC Guiding Principles. First, the
HRC Guiding Principles deal explicitly with the human rights impacts of
SODRs, as well as all other aspects of the human rights implications of external
debt. Nevertheless, the HRC Guiding Principles are not specifically referred to
in any of the other norms and standards relevant to SODRs discussed above. As
will be seen below, they are also not specifically referenced in any of the
human rights policies of the leading financial institutions, although many of
them do make specific references to other relevant norms and standards in their
human rights policies.70 Second, the HRC Guiding Principles, which were
endorsed by the UN Human Rights Council less than a month after the
endorsement of the UNGPs, are clearly influenced by them and their view of
the responsibilities of corporations to respect human rights.71
Finally, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) has adopted
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id., paragraphs 15-16.
Id., paragraph 18.
Id., paragraphs 19-20.
Id., paragraphs 36-41.
Id., paragraph 43.
Id., paragraphs 48-51.
Id., paragraph 52.
Id., paragraph 53.
See infra notes 101-108 and accompanying text (discussion of human rights policies of

71.

U.N. Human Rights Council, supra note 57, paragraph 9 and accompanying footnote.

banks).
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resolutions dealing with sovereign debt restructurings and the need for a more
effective and balanced sovereign debt workout mechanism. In 2014, it adopted
a resolution calling for the establishment of a multilateral legal framework for
sovereign debt restructuring.72 The Resolution does not make specific reference
to human rights. On the other hand, it does refer to the UNCTAD Principles on
Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing and on the need for the
restructuring process to contribute to the fulfillment of the sustainable
development goals and the progressive development and codification of
international law. In 2015, the UNGA passed another resolution that sets out
the basic principles for sovereign debt restructuring processes.73 The resolution
includes recognition of the sovereign prerogative to make its own economic
policies, and calls for the sovereign debt renegotiation process to be based on
the principles of good faith, transparency, impartiality, equitable treatment,
sovereign immunity, legitimacy, and sustainability. The resolution includes a
definition of sustainability that states that the SODR outcome should preserve
creditors’ rights and promote “sustained and inclusive growth and sustainable
development”, minimize “economic and social costs”, warrant the “stability of
the international financial system” and respect “human rights”.74
It should also be noted that the IMF has also issued many documents
dealing with sovereign debt restructuring, including proposals for a sovereign
debt restructuring mechanisms.75 However, these documents do not mention
human rights as a factor for creditors and debtors to consider in their
restructuring negotiations.
The common feature of all these documents is that they seek to establish
processes for financial transactions, including debt workouts, with sovereign
debtors that are transparent, based on good faith by both parties and will result
in sustainable outcomes. In addition, the 2015 UNGA resolution includes
principles relating to respect for the sovereignty of the debtor state, equitable
treatment by the debtor of all its creditors, and creditor decisions by majority
voting. The resolution includes a definition of sustainability that stipulates that
the SODR outcome should preserve creditors’ rights and promote “sustained
and inclusive growth and sustainable development”, minimize “economic and
social costs, warrant the “stability of the international financial system” and
respect “human rights”.76 This definition of sustainability is similar to the one
in the Roadmap, which states “Sustainability requires that sovereign debt
workouts are completed in a timely and efficient manner and lead to a stable
debt situation while minimizing costs for economic and social rights and
development in the debtor state”.
As indicated, only three of these documents mention human rights. They

72. G.A. Res. 68/304 (Sept. 17, 2014).
73. G.A. Res. 69/319, supra note 26.
74. Id., paragraph 8.
75. Krueger, supra note 26: International Monetary Fund, A Survey of Experiences with
Emerging Market Sovereign Debt Restructurings, IMFs Monetary and Capital Markets Department
(June 5, 2012), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2012/060512.pdf.
76. G.A. Res. 69/319, supra note 26, paragraph 8.
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are the HRC Guiding Principles, the 2015 UNGA Resolution containing
principles on the sovereign debt restructuring process and the UNCTAD
Roadmap.77 Although, the HRC Guidelines have been endorsed by the UN
Human Right Council, it is not clear if they have had any impact on the
creditors. As indicated they have not been referred to in any of the other norms
and standards dealing with SODRs or in any of the human rights policies of the
major international financial institutions. There also does not appear to be any
evidence that they have been expressly used by sovereign debtors in SODRs.
The UNGA merely mentions human rights in its definition of sustainability.
The third document was prepared by a group of experts and has not been
formally endorsed by states.78 Moreover, the Roadmap, which only expressly
mentions the need to respect social and economic rights, does not discuss
human rights in any detail, and does not cross reference any human rights
treaties or other human rights documents, such as the UNGPs.
III. INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND STANDARDS DEALING WITH BUSINESS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS
The most detailed and authoritative international instrument dealing with
business and human rights is the United Nations Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights (UNGPs).79 It was endorsed by consensus by the
United Nations Human Rights Council in 2011. Its “protect, respect and
remedy” framework has been incorporated into a number of other international
instruments dealing with the human rights responsibilities of particular types of
businesses, for example multinational companies, in the OECD Guidelines on
Multinational Enterprises (Guidelines). It also been incorporated into some
standards dealing with particular types of business activities, for example the
Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, developed by the
extractive industries in the US and the UK and interested civil society
organizations, and applicable to the security practices in the extractive industry.
The applicability of the UNGPs to financial institutions has been
acknowledged, as indicated above, by various individual financial institutions80
as well as by groupings of financial institutions.81 In addition, it is the

77. It should be noted that in January 2015, the current U.N. Independent Expert on foreign
debt and other related international financial obligations proposed 6 human rights benchmarks that
should be taken into account in developing a multilateral framework for debt restructurings that build on
the UNGPs and the UNCTAD Principles. However, these benchmarks have not yet been incorporated
into any set of norms and standards applicable to SODRs by the Human Rights Council. See, Juan Pablo
Bohoslavsky, Towards a Multilateral Legal Framework for Debt Restructuring: Six Human Rights
Benchmarks
States
Should
Consider
(Jan
26,
2015),
available
at
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Development/IEDebt/DebtRestructuring.pdf.
78. It should be noted that the Principles on Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing
have been specifically endorsed by some countries, namely Argentina, Brazil, Cameroon, Gabon,
Germany, Honduras, Italy, Morocco, Nepal, Norway, Mauritania and Paraguay. See UNCTAD,
Progress Report (2013), available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/gdsddf2013misc2_en.pdf.
79. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note
11.
80. See statements by individual banks cited above, infra notes 103-108 and accompanying
text.
81. See Thun Group of Banks, Discussion Paper for Banks on Implications of Principles 16–
21
(October
2013),
available
at
http://business-
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international norm most relevant to the human rights impacts of SODRs
because it deals with both the human rights obligations of the debtor state and
the human rights responsibilities of the creditor financial institutions. It is
discussed in more detail below.
The OECD Guidelines are the oldest general standard applicable to
multinational enterprises (MNEs). It is important to note that they are intended
to provide guidance from states to MNEs under their jurisdiction but are not
binding on either the OECD member states or their MNEs. However, the states
are expected to encourage the MNEs in their jurisdiction to comply with these
Guidelines in their transnational operations. They are also expected to establish
National Contact Points, to monitor the implementation of the Guidelines and
to receive complaints about compliance with the Guidelines.
The Guidelines, which were originally developed in the 1970s, deal with
all aspects of an enterprise’s relations with its host governments. They are
applicable to all MNEs82 and so are applicable to all financial institutions that
operated transnationally. They have been revised a number of times. The most
recent revision was in 2011, when a new section was added specifically to deal
with human rights. The new section is based on the UNGPs and it closely
tracks those provisions of the UNGPs dealing with the responsibilities of
companies. In order to assist financial institutions to meet their obligations
under the Guidelines, the OECD, in 2014 prepared a guidance note for the
financial sector on due diligence.83 It is intended to help them determine their
responsibilities for conducting due diligence in their operations and in their
business relations so that they avoid causing, contributing to or being directly
linked to adverse human rights impacts through these operations and
relationships.
Another norm of general application to companies is the UN Global
Compact.84 The Compact requires signatory companies to pledge that they will
comply with ten principles, the first two of which deal with human rights.
These two principles require signatory companies to “support and respect the
protection of internationally proclaimed human rights”85 and to “make sure that
they are not complicit in human rights abuses”.86 The four principles87 dealing
with labor issues are also relevant to the human rights responsibilities of
signatory companies.88 They require signatories to comply with international
humanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/thun-group-discussion-paper-final-2-oct-2013.pdf;
Equator
Principles
(June
4,
2013),
available
at
http://www.equatorprinciples.com/resources/equator_principles_iii.pdf; Global Alliance for Banking on Values, Principles
on Sustainable Banking (2009), available at http://www.gabv.org/about-us/our-principles.
82. OECD Guidelines, supra note 13, Article I paragraph 4.
83. OECD GLOBAL FORUM ON RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS CONDUCT, DUE DILIGENCE IN THE
FINANCIAL SECTOR - ADVERSE IMPACTS DIRECTLY LINKED TO FINANCIAL SECTOR OPERATIONS,
PRODUCTS
OR
SERVICES
BY
A
BUSINESS
RELATIONSHIP
(2014), available at
https://mneguidelines.oecd.org/globalforumonresponsiblebusinessconduct/GFRBC-2014-financialsector-document-1.pdf.
84. U.N. Global Compact, supra note 12.
85. Id., Principle 1.
86. Id., Principle 2.
87. Id., Principles 3-6.
88. A total of 8610 companies have signed onto the Global Compact; this includes 171 banks
and a total of 905 financial services companies. Information retrieved from
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standards dealing with freedom of association and collective bargaining, forced
labor, child labor and non-discrimination. It is important to note that the
Compact is voluntary and signatories are only expected to submit information
on how they are implementing the principles to the UN. There is no formal
monitoring or evaluation of their compliance, although companies can be
dropped from the list of signatory companies if they do not provide the
requisite reports to the UN. In addition, the principles are not very detailed and
so provide significant room for interpretation.
The third norm of general application, ISO 26000, is issued by the
International Organization of Standards (ISO) and deals with social
responsibility. This norm is also voluntary and can be used by all companies.
According to the ISO, ISO 26000 “is intended to provide organizations with
guidance concerning social responsibility”.89 The ISO does not certify that
companies are in compliance with ISO 26000 and its website specifically states
that the norm “is not intended to be interpreted as an “international standard”,
“guideline” or “recommendation” . . . Further, it is not intended to provide a
basis for legal actions, complaints, defenses or other claims in any
international, domestic or other proceeding”.90 Nevertheless it has a detailed
section on human rights that, like the UNGPs, deals with issues like due
diligence and grievance mechanisms to address the potential human rights
impacts of the operations and relationships of companies adopting ISO
26000.91
In addition, to these norms and standards of general application there are
some that are specifically applicable to the financial sector. The best known of
these is the Equator Principles,92 which is designed to guide the conduct of
banks engaged in project financing. It has been adopted by 83 financial
institutions in 36 countries,93 all of which are expected to prepare annual
reports on their implementation of the Equator Principles. The Principles are
modeled on the IFC’s Sustainability Framework, which provides guidance to
the IFC and its clients on what the IFC expects in regard to assessing and
monitoring the impact on sustainability of those projects that it funds. Both the
IFC framework and the Equator Principles include provisions dealing with
human rights, which, like the UNGPs, impose a responsibility on companies to
assess the human rights impact of their activities. However, in both cases, this
guidance is limited to the project financing context. Nevertheless, the Equator
Principles can be seen as providing some sense of the standards of conduct
expected from financial institutions when their operations have a significant
impact on sustainability, including a significant human rights impact.

https://www.unglobalcompact.org/ (April 14, 2016).
89. See http://www.iso.org/iso/catalogue_detail?csnumber=42546 (April 14, 2016).
90. Id.
91. See
ISO,
DISCOVERING
ISO
26000
(2014),
available
at
http://www.iso.org/iso/discovering_iso_26000.pdf. Interestingly for a document that is expected to
promote social responsibility, the ISO sells ISO 26000 for a price of CHF 198, which effectively makes
it unaffordable to many potential stakeholders that may have an interest in understanding how the
companies that may adopt ISO 26000 understand and implement their social responsibility.
92. Equator Principles, supra note 81.
93. Id.

2016]

Can Parallel Lines Ever Meet?

219

The one international standard that has been developed within the United
Nations that is explicitly aimed at the financial sector is the United Nations
Environmental Programme’s Principles for Responsible Investment.94 Its six
principles are designed to encourage institutional investors and commit
signatories to pay greater attention to environmental, social and governance
issues in their operations and business relations. There is no explicit mention of
human rights in these principles. To date approximately 1500 asset managers,
investment managers and professional service partners have signed onto these
principles.95
UNGPs
The UNGPs, which were endorsed by consensus by the state members of
the UN Human Rights Council, are applicable to all businesses, including
financial institutions, and to all states. This non-binding instrument is based on
the following three propositions:96
1)

Under existing human rights law, states have an obligation to respect,
protect and fulfill the human rights of their citizens.

2)

Business enterprises have a responsibility to comply with all applicable
law and to respect the human rights of those individuals that are impacted
by their operations.

3)

There need to be appropriate remedies available to all who are harmed by
the failure of states and companies to live up to their respective
obligations and responsibilities.

Based on these propositions, the UNGPs consist of thirty-one principles
divided into three pillars. The first pillar, which consists of ten principles,
focuses on the state duty to protect human rights.97 It stipulates that the state
must protect against human rights being abused by third parties including
business enterprises that are subject to its jurisdiction. In furtherance of this
obligation, states must take steps to prevent human rights violations through
their policies, legislation and regulations. They should also clearly set out their
expectations of the business enterprises operating in their jurisdictions
regarding human rights and, where appropriate, should encourage businesses to
communicate how they address human rights impacts in their operations. They
also have an obligation to promote respect for human rights by the business
enterprises with which they conduct commercial transactions.
The second pillar, which consists of thirteen principles, deals with the
responsibilities of business enterprises.98 It states that business enterprises
should respect human rights, which means that they should avoid infringing
human rights and should address the adverse human rights impacts in which
they are involved. It also clarifies that for these purposes, “human rights”
94. United Nations Environmental Programme, Principles for Responsible Investment (2006),
available at http://www.unpri.org/about-pri/the-six-principles/.
95. See http://www.unpri.org/signatories/signatories/ (April 14, 2016).
96. U.N. Global Compact, supra note 11.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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means the rights expressed in the International Covenants on Civil and Political
Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the principles set out
in the ILO’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. The
principles also stipulate that businesses should have human rights policies that
are approved at a high level in the company and are publicly available. The
UNGPs also clearly state that the responsibility to respect human rights
requires companies to avoid causing or contributing to adverse human rights
impacts and to seek to mitigate or prevent adverse impacts that are directly
linked to their operations. It further stipulates that companies should have in
place due diligence procedures to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for the
human rights impacts of their operations. This process should assess both actual
and potential impacts that are caused by the company, to which the company
contributes or which may be directly linked to its operations. The company
should communicate how these impacts will be addressed and be monitored. It
is important to note that these human rights impact studies differ from
“standard” corporate due diligence procedures in that their focus is on the
impact of the company’s operations on its various stakeholders—workers,
customers, communities—rather than on the potential risks to the company
arising from the operations. Nevertheless, human rights impact assessments
(HRIA) may be similar in methodology and may address some of the issues
considered in a company’s environmental, social and health impact
assessments. In fact, in many cases, the company can consider incorporating
the HRIA into its environmental and social impact assessment.99
The UNGPs make clear that the appropriate human rights due diligence
process in any particular business situation will vary according to the size of
the enterprise, the risk of severe human rights impacts and the nature and
context of the operation. The nature of the enterprise’s response to the
identified adverse impacts will also vary according to the severity of the
impact, the role that the enterprise plays in the adverse impact, and its leverage
in addressing the adverse impact. The UNGPs also make clear that the
responsibility of the company is ongoing and it is expected to continue
monitoring the situation and to keep assessing the adverse impacts throughout
the life of the transaction or operation. It is important to note that the fact that
the due diligence is ongoing, indicates that the UNGPs contemplate that the
human rights impacts of the project can vary over the life of the project or
transaction and that the company should continue monitoring and dealing with
the impacts as they evolve over the life of the project. Finally, the UNGPs
acknowledge that the company may need to prioritize actions to address the
actual and potential adverse human rights impacts of its operations and
suggests that it should first seek to prevent and mitigate those impacts that are
most severe or for which delayed responses may make them irremediable.
The third pillar deals with access to remedies.100 It stipulates that states,
as part of their duty to protect against human rights abuses must take steps to
99. THE DANISH INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, INTEGRATING HUMAN RIGHTS INTO
ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND HEALTH IMPACT ASSESSMENTS – A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR THE OIL
AND GAS INDUSTRY (2013); see also IPIECA, available at www.ipieca.org and www.humanrights.dk.
100. Equator Principles, supra note 81.
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ensure that those who are adversely affected by a business’ operations should
have access to either judicial or non-judicial remedies. The UNGPS also state
that businesses, in order to ensure that grievances relating to adverse human
rights impacts, are addressed as early as possible and can be remediated as
directly as possible, should provide effective operational level grievance
mechanisms. Finally, the UNGPs require that in order for non-judicial
grievance mechanisms, including operational level mechanisms, to be
considered effective they must be legitimate, accessible, predictable, equitable,
transparent, rights compatible, and a source of continuous learning by the
company. The Principles also suggest that these mechanisms should be based
on engagement and dialogue with stakeholder groups.
It is clear from this brief description of the UNGPs, that there is no
specific type of business or financial transaction to which they are not, at least
in principle, applicable. In fact, a number of financial institutions have begun to
express support for this view in their human rights policies, which are publicly
available documents and in their public reports.101 For example, JP Morgan
Chase & Co. states in its human rights policy that “. . .we acknowledge the
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights as the recognized
framework for corporations to respect human rights in their own operations and
through their business relationships.”102 Barclays, in its human rights policy
states that: “We aim to operate in accordance with the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights as well as other international standards, including the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises and International Labour Organization Core
Conventions.”103 Goldman Sachs, states in its policy that: “As a global
financial institution, Goldman Sachs recognizes and takes seriously its
responsibility to help protect, preserve and promote human rights around the
world.”104 HSBC states in its human rights policy that: “HSBC is guided by the
International Bill of Human Rights and supports the UN Declaration of Human
Rights and the principles concerning fundamental rights set out in the
International Labour Organisation’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work. . . . The UN Guiding Principles state that all private enterprises
hold an equal responsibility to respect human rights. HSBC is committed to
respecting human rights”.105 Deutsche Bank states in its Corporate
Responsibility Report for 2014 at p34: “We are committed to respecting human
rights, in accordance with our values and beliefs . . . and as a signatory to the
101. It should be noted that not all banks have human rights policies or include human rights
statements in their reports on sustainability and corporate social responsibility. For example leading
Asian institutions such as Mizuho Bank Ltd., Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group, and ICICI Bank Ltd do
not have explicit human rights policies.
102. See https://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/About-JPMC/ab-human-rights.htm.
103. Barclays
Group
Statement
on
Human
Rights
2015,
available
at
https://www.home.barclays/content/dam/barclayspublic/docs/Citizenship/Policy-Positions/barclaysstatement-human-rights.pdf.
104. See
Goldman
Sachs
statement
on
Human
Rights,
available
at
http://www.goldmansachs.com/investor-relations/corporate-governance/corporate-governancedocuments/human-rights-statement.pdf.
105. HSBC
Statement
on
Human
Rights
2015,
available
at
http://www.hsbc.com/~/media/hsbc-com/citizenship/our-values/pdfs/150930-hsbc-statement-on-humanrights.
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UN Global Compact. Our policies and guidelines reflect our commitment to the
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.”106
Banks are not the only financial institutions to have stated that it is their
policy to respect human rights in their operations. Insurance companies have
made similar statements. For example, Allianz states in its 2014 Sustainability
Report that:
[R]especting human rights is not just an issue for states and governments today.
Companies from all industries have an increasing responsibility to incorporate
human rights issues into their business standards, wherever and however they
operate. . . .Corporations are not only expected to take into consideration the human
rights impacts directly caused by their own activities and operations, but also those
linked to a business relationship with business partners. The latter makes the
determination of the appropriate action more complex, as the link is only through
the business relationship. Corporations must look at human rights not only from a
business risk perspective, but also from the perspective of the people impacted, the
107
“rights-holders.

In fact, of the 38 financial institutions represented on the Board of
Trustees of the IIF, 30 have human rights policies that include similar
statements to the ones cited above.108 All the institutions cited above except
Barclays are represented on the IIF Board. Moreover, 21 of the 30 globally
significant financial institutions (GSIFIs) have human rights policies that
specifically refer to at least some of the applicable human rights norms and
standards. In fact, eight GSIFIs specifically express support for the UNGPs in
their human rights policies.109 Another GSIFI has a public statement that
indicates that it accepts that it has human rights responsibilities but it does not
expressly refer to any of the applicable human rights norms and standards and
two other GSIFIs do not have human rights policies but have signed the UN
Global Compact.110
106. See https://www.db.com/cr/en/positions/human_rights.htm.
107. See https://www.allianz.com/en/sustainability/sustainability_report_2014/special_topics
/human_rights.html/.
108. The 30 financial institutions that have human rights policies are: HSBC, Credit Suisse AG,
SEB, Akbank T.A.S, Swiss Re Ltd., Itaú Unibanco Holding S/A, Banco de Crédito del Perú, Erste
Group Bank AG, Allianz SE, UBS AG, Commerzbank AG, Standard Chartered Bank, Grupo Santander,
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., Citigroup, Deutsche Bank AG, Zurich Insurance Group, UniCredit
Group, Aberdeen Asset Management, BBVA, Morgan Stanley, DBS Group Holdings and & DBS Bank
Ltd, ING Group, BNY Mellon, MetLife, Inc., Standard Bank Group Ltd, BNP Paribas, Société
Générale, JPMorgan Chase, Scotiabank; the 8 financial institutions that do not have human rights
policies are: Gulf international Bank, Qatar National Bank, Mizuho Bank Ltd., Mitsubishi UFJ Financial
Group, ICICI Bank Ltd, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group,
Bank of China.
109. The eight GSIFIs that express support for the UNGPs in their human rights policy are
Citigroup, Deutsche Bank, UniCredit, Credit Suisse, Nordea, Royal Bank of Scotland, Santander, and
UBS.
110. Information is based on a review of the policies available on the websites of the GSIFIs, as
defined by the Financial Stability Board. See http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/2015-update-oflist-of-global-systemically-important-banks-G-SIBs.pdf for list of GSIFIs. The 21 GSIFIs that have
human rights policy are: HSBC, JP Morgan Chase, Barclays, BNP Paribas, Citigroup, Deutsche Bank
AG, Bank of America, Credit Suisse, Goldman Sachs Inc., Morgan Stanley, Unicredit, BNY Mellon,
Groupe BPCE, Group Credit Agricole, ING Group, Nordea, Royal Bank of Scotland, Société Générale,
Standard Chartered Bank, UBS, Grupo Santander. The GSIFI, which has a public statement that
indicates that it accepts that it has human rights responsibilities but does not expressly refer to any of the
applicable human rights norms, is Wells Fargo. The two GSIFIs that do not indicate expressly state that
they accept human rights responsibility but have signed the U.N. Global Compact are State Street and
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This suggests that, at least in theory, the UNGPs should be taken into
account by the debtor state and its commercial creditors in a sovereign debt
workout. The issue of what role, if any, the UNGPS should play in SODRs will
be considered in the next section.
IV. THE ROLE OF THE UNGPS IN SODR111
The issue of the potential role of the UNGPs in SODRs can be divided
into three sub-issues: First, should the UNGPs be part of the framework that
helps guide SODRs? Second, can the UNGPs add value to SODRs? Third,
what do the UNGPs suggest that the debtor and creditors should do in regard to
assessing and preventing or mitigating adverse human rights impacts in
SODRs? Each question will be discussed in turn, below.
A. The Role of the UNGPs in the SODR Framework
First, I will address the question of whether the UNGPs should be part of
the framework that helps guide transactions in SODRs. As indicated above, the
UNGPs are applicable to all businesses in all their operations and business
relations. This suggests that the UNGPs, at least in theory, should be applicable
to SODRs in the case of states that have commercial institutions as creditors.112
This supposition is strengthened by the fact that the UNGPs do not include any
language indicating that there are exceptions to their applicability to all
businesses and their activities.
It is, of course, also true that the UNGPs are non-binding. This means
that, in principle, both the sovereign debtor and its creditors are free to decide
not to utilize the UNGPs in their SODRs. However, for both parties such a
decision does not necessarily mean that they have no human rights
responsibilities in conducting an SODR. The reason is that the sovereign debtor
is bound, under international law, by the human rights treaties that it has signed
and ratified and by customary international law.113 This means, since all states
have signed at least some treaties, and most states have signed the two core

Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Limited. The six GSIFIs that do not have a human rights
policy or any statement referring to any human rights norms and standards are: Mitsibushi UFG FG,
Agricultural Bank of China, Bank of China, China Construction Bank, Mizuho FG, Sumitomo Mitsui
FG.
111. It is important to note that the U.N. Principles on Foreign Debt and Human Rights are also
applicable to SODRs. They are not directly discussed in this section for two reasons. First, as indicated
above, they are based, in part, on the UNGPs. Thus, they impose similar responsibilities on both debtors
and creditors as the UNGPs. Second, the Principles do not seem to have gained any influence with
financial institutions. For example, they have not been referred to in any of the human rights policies of
individual financial institutions reviewed for this paper.
112. The UNGPs apply to businesses. Consequently, they would only be applicable to
commercial creditors of sovereign debtors. This means that the discussion in this section is unlikely to
be relevant to low income sovereign debtors who only have official bilateral and multilateral institutions
as creditors.
113. See John Humphrey, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Its History, Impact and
Judicial Character, in HUMAN RIGHT: THIRTY YEARS AFTER THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION (Bertrand
G. Ramcharan ed., 1984); Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe, The
Helsinki Accord, 14 ILM 293 (1975); Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights in National and International Law, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 287 (1995).
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international human rights covenants114—the Covenants on Civil and Political
Rights115 and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights116—that all sovereign
debtor states have some binding human rights obligations. At a minimum,
therefore, each debtor state,117 in a SODR process, will be required to respect,
protect and fulfill the rights enshrined in the human rights treaties it has signed
or that are binding under customary international law, regardless of its views of
the applicability of the UNGPs to the process. This means, inter alia, it has an
obligation to protect the rights of its citizens from any adverse human rights
impacts they may suffer that are caused by third parties, such as businesses
operating in their territory or that are directly linked to these businesses or to
which these businesses are contributing.
The situation of the creditors is more complicated. They are not
signatories of any of the human rights treaties and, since they are not subjects
of international law, are not directly bound by customary international law.
Consequently, they do not have any explicit human rights obligations under
international law. However, they are obliged to comply with the law in the
states in which they operate. This suggests that, to the extent that these states
have incorporated their international human rights treaties into domestic law,
these companies will be required to respect the international human rights
commitments of their home and host states. In addition, the companies may
have assumed at least a moral commitment to respect human rights to the
extent they have adopted their own individual human rights policies or have
signed onto one or more of the applicable international standards dealing with
human rights and businesses.118 As indicated above, a number of leading
financial institutions have adopted human rights policies in which they
expressly acknowledge that they have human rights responsibilities, and that
these responsibilities are based on core international human rights
instruments.119 Some of them have also expressed support for the non-binding
international standards. These institutions have not indicated that their human
rights policies are not applicable to any specific category of their activities.

114. There are 168 state parties to ICCPR as of 18 March 2016. Seven states have signed but
not ratified treaty, 22 states neither signed nor ratified treaty. There are 164 state parties to ICESCR as
of 18 March 2016, six states have signed but not ratified treaty, 25 states neither signed nor ratified
treaty. Information retrieved from http://indicators.ohchr.org/.
115. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) entered into force on 23 March
1976, G.A. Res. 21/2200A (XXI), available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest
/ccpr.pdf.
116. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), entered into force
3
January
1976,
G.A.
Res.
21/2200A
(XXI),
993
UNTS
3,
available
at
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/cescr.pdf.
117. It should be noted that the home state of the creditor institutions may also have some extraterritorial human rights obligations, including to ensure that their creditor institutions respect the human
rights of the populations of the debtor state. See Maastricht Principles on Extra-Territorial Obligations
of States in the Area of Economic Social and Cultural Rights (2013) available at
http://www.etoconsortium.org/nc/en/mainnavigation/library/maastrichtprinciples/?tx_drblob_pi1%5Bdown
loadUid%5D=23 (last visited April 14, 2016).
118. In the case of the financial sector, the relevant international standards are the UNGPs,
Global Compact, Equator Principles, UNEP Principles on Responsible Investing, Thun Group statement,
OECD Guidelines.
119. See examples supra notes 101-110 (dealing with IIF members and GSIFIs that have
human rights policies).
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Consequently, there is no principled basis on which they can claim that either
their own human rights policies or those international standards for which they
have expressed support are not applicable to SODRs. The failure to apply them
without an adequate explanation, therefore, should result at least in reputational
costs to these financial institutions. It may also, at least at the margins, provide
the debtor with some bargaining leverage in their negotiations with these
financial institutions.
The conclusion to be drawn from the above is that the obligations and
responsibilities set out in the UNGPs do apply to SODRs, at least in regard to
the sovereign debtor and to those creditors that have voluntarily accepted the
responsibilities of the UNGPs and have not expressly excluded SODRs from
this responsibility.
B. The Value-Add of UNGPs
The second question that the parties must consider is whether the UNGPs
can add value to their efforts to restructure the sovereign’s debts. There are
several reasons for thinking that the UNGPs can add value to these difficult
negotiations.
First, as shown above, it is almost inevitable that SODRs will have
adverse human rights impacts. This follows from the fact that the debtor does
not have sufficient funds to meet all its obligations to both its creditors and its
citizens. Consequently, it will have to deprive some of these stakeholders of
resources—financing, goods and services—that they are expecting. These
decisions of the debtor will have human rights consequences at least to the
extent that they affect expenditures on such items as health, education, social
services, the justice system, and unemployment compensation. There may also
be human rights impacts if the debtor’s policies generate significant public
opposition. The UNGPs, by providing guidance to states on how they should
account for the human rights impacts arising from their financial transactions,
can assist the sovereign debtor in ensuring that it adequately accounts for the
actual and potential adverse human rights impacts in the planning, negotiation
and implementation of its SODR.
Second, as indicated above, many of the globally significant financial
institutions, which are likely to be participants in many SODRs, have publicly
acknowledged that they do have human rights responsibilities. Moreover, a
number of the leading financial institutions have specifically expressed their
support for the UNGPs in their human rights policies. It should be noted that
these institutions have not explicitly stated whether or not their human rights
policies apply to SODRs. In the absence of such a statement and given that
their policies appear to be applicable to all the activities of the institutions,
there does not seem any a priori reason to assume that their policies are not
applicable to SODRs. The UNGPs, by providing guidance to financial
institutions on how they should implement their responsibility to respect human
rights can assist the creditors to understand how to structure SODR outcomes
that avoid or mitigate the adverse human rights effects of their SODR proposals
and of the eventual agreements that they reach with their sovereign debtors.
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Third, the UNGPs, with their emphasis on due diligence and access to
remedies, remind the debtor and its creditors that they will need to take all
stakeholders who may suffer adverse impacts into account in their transaction.
This is useful because, at least in principle, they will ensure that there are no
interests on either the borrower or the lender side that are not taken into account
in the planning and execution of the SODR. This means that the interests of
those debtor country citizens who are adversely affected by the budgetary
allocation decisions of the sovereign debtor should receive due consideration.
In addition, it means that the interests of relevant creditor stakeholders, such as
pensioners who are bondholders120 who may be adversely by the SODR
outcome, should be taken into account.
Fourth, history suggests that SODRs that do not pay adequate attention to
the adverse human rights and other impacts of their outcomes may not be fully
implemented and may need to be renegotiated. This can happen because, inter
alia, the debtor is unable to implement the agreement as planned due to the
opposition of domestic stakeholders or because the financial markets lack
confidence in the viability of the outcome and so do not participate as
anticipated in it. These developments may force the parties to renegotiate the
restructuring, possibly under more difficult financial and more contentious
negotiating conditions and at considerable expense to the parties. The net effect
of these developments is likely to be that the adverse human rights impacts of
the SODR outcome will also be exacerbated. The UNGPs can help the parties
mitigate the risk of such a situation by making sure that they pay appropriate
attention to human rights considerations in their first round of SODR
negotiations.
It should be noted that incorporating the UNGPs into the SODR also has
a cost. This follows from the fact that the UNGPs add a new requirement onto
the SODR process. They require the parties to incorporate human rights
considerations, as determined through a human rights impact assessment, into
the SODR process. As will be discussed below, performing an adequate human
rights impact assessment under the time pressures of a sovereign debt crisis and
in the context in which the outcome of the SODR is hard to predict ex ante is
challenging. Inevitably the assessment will be imperfect and is likely to expose
the creditors to reputational risk. This follows from the probability that the
SODR will result in substantial adverse impacts for at least some segments of
the debtor country population and from the fact that the sovereign debtor has a
strong incentive to blame the creditors for the adverse impacts of the SODR.
However, it is important to recognize that the creditors are likely to incur
this cost regardless of whether it follows the UNGPs and conducts the requisite
human rights impact assessment or not. The reason is that if, in fact, there are
adverse impacts, the debtor and its adversely affected citizens will have a
strong incentive to blame the creditors for them. Showing that they are
complying with the UNGPs may help the creditors mitigate these risks. The
reason is that they can show that they have taken human rights considerations

120. This was the case with some of Argentina’s creditors and with the holders of Puerto Rican
bonds.
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into account and that they have done so in conformity with the best applicable
international standard. In addition, their human rights impact assessments
might help demonstrate that they have worked to reach the least costly and
most feasible, in human rights terms, SODRs agreements.
The above suggests that on balance the benefits of incorporating the
UNGPs into the SODR outweigh the costs. The reason is that the benefits flow
directly from the UNGPs and cannot easily be earned from a substitute
approach. The costs arise from the specific context of a sovereign debt crisis
and, to that extent, are unavoidable. However, the UNGPs may help the parties
mitigate the consequences of these costs.
C. Debtors, Creditors and Human Rights in SODRs
In order to answer the third question—what the UNGPs suggest that the
debtor and creditors should do in regard to human rights in SODRs—each of
the three pillars of the UNGPs will be discussed separately.
1. The First Pillar: Duties of the Sovereign Debtor
As indicated above, the state, under international human rights law has a
duty to protect, respect and fulfill the human rights of its citizens. This duty
includes the duty to protect its citizens against human rights violations by
business enterprises.
This means that the state has a general duty to protect its citizens against
adverse human rights impacts that are caused by financial institutions, to which
financial institutions contribute or which are directly linked to financial
institutions. This duty includes protecting its citizens against the adverse human
rights impacts that flow from financial transactions between the state and
financial institutions. In other words, the state, in the context of SODR has two
duties. It must ensure that its own actions comply with its duty to protect,
respect and fulfill the human rights of its citizens. In addition, it has a duty to
protect its citizens against the adverse human rights impacts that may arise
from or be connected to the conduct of its creditors in its financial transactions.
In regard to its own actions, in order to ensure that it is not failing to
comply with its own human rights obligations, the state needs to determine the
nature of the adverse impacts of its proposed course of action in the SODR. In
particular, it needs to consider if these actions will merely result in slower
realization of some or all of its subjects’ rights than would otherwise have
happened or if it will result in an actual deterioration in some or all of the
human rights of its subjects over the same period. Armed with this knowledge
the sovereign debtor will have to determine what it can do to prevent or
mitigate the adverse impacts. To the extent this is not possible, at least over the
relevant time period for the transaction, it will have to decide what it can do to
compensate those adversely affected for their losses. It is important to note that
this obligation, if fully complied with, requires the state to make an assessment
of how the individual adverse impacts will evolve over the life of the SODR
transaction and also how the various human rights impacts will interact with
each other over the relevant time period. It will also have to consider whether
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either these individual or cumulative impacts will continue beyond the term of
the SODR. This assessment may also result in the state having to make some
decisions on whether it is acceptable to impose the adverse impacts on the
present generation of citizens with the expectation that doing so will generate
benefits for future generations.
The state’s obligation to protect its citizens against human rights
violations by its creditor counterparts means that it should not agree to a
transaction that causes avoidable adverse impacts on the human rights of its
citizens. 121 This does not necessarily mean that the state cannot agree to any
SODR that has adverse human rights consequences, particularly when the
exigencies of the situation leading to the SODR are taken into account.
However, it does mean that the state needs to understand the human rights
impacts of the offers made to it by the creditors and to assess whether these
impacts can be avoided or mitigated if the offer is accepted and implemented.
In order to make a fully informed decision in this regard, the debtor should be
aware of the human rights policies of the financial institutions with which it is
doing business so that it can understand if their offers are consistent with these
policies and, if not, why the financial institutions are deviating from their own
policies. Finally, the debtor state needs to engage in discussions with the
creditors about the most effective way to mitigate the adverse human rights
impacts of their transaction within the context of the SODR. In this regard, the
sovereign debtor needs to make sure that its creditors understand the debtor’s
human rights obligations and how it thinks they should apply in the context of
the SODR.
Within the context of SODRs, the state’s obligation to protect needs to
include some plan for either restoring the ex ante human rights situation by the
end of the SODR implementation period or for compensating those adversely
affected for their losses. This requires the state to assess the evolution of both
the impacts of the SODR transaction and the steps taken to mitigate the adverse
impacts over time. It will also have to determine what to do in the event that its
projections about the evolution of these impacts turns out to be inaccurate and
the human rights situation turns out to be different from what it anticipated.
This brief description of the state’s obligations suggests the most
effective way to gain this insight, at least in theory, is for the state to do a
careful human rights impact assessment of the likely human rights
consequences of the SODR. As indicated in the UNGPs, although in the

121. See Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 3, The nature
of States parties’ obligations (Fifth session, 1990), U.N. Doc. E/1991/23, annex III at 86 (Dec 14,
1990), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by
Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 14 (May 27, 2003). Paragraph 10 of this
Comment stipulates that states have “a minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very
least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights…it must be noted that any assessment as to whether
a State has discharged its minimum core obligation must also take account of resource constraints
applying within the country concerned. In order for a State party to be able to attribute its failure to meet
at least its minimum core obligations to a lack of available resources it must demonstrate that every
effort has been made to use all resources that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of
priority, those minimum obligations.” Paragraph 11 of the Comment adds that “…even where the
available resources are demonstrably inadequate, the obligation remains for a State party to strive to
ensure the widest possible enjoyment of the relevant rights under the prevailing circumstances.”
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context of the responsibilities of business, such due diligence is not a one-off
requirement. Instead the state should continue monitoring and assessing the
situation on an ongoing basis throughout the life of the transaction. This
suggests that the state has an obligation to perform the HRIA in advance of its
decision to enter into the SODR and to continue updating it through the
negotiations with its creditors and then throughout the implementation of the
agreement reached in the SODR.122
There are two important considerations that the state will need to take into
account in undertaking the HRIA. The first is that the advent of a debt crisis
can happen quickly and can demand a prompt response. Thus, the HRIA must
be done under considerable time pressure that is exacerbated by the fact that the
process leading to the decision to enter into the SODR must be managed with
discretion. If the news that the sovereign debtor is contemplating entering into a
SODR leaks prematurely it can adversely affect the financial situation of the
state, and thereby exacerbate the human rights consequences of the SODR.
This suggests that the HRIA in the case of SODR is unlikely to comply
with best practice standards of transparency and participation and detailed
analysis in regard to such impact studies.123 This also means that there is a
heightened risk of unexpected adverse human rights outcomes once the SODR
is being implemented. This, in turn, underscores the importance of the debtor
creating a grievance mechanism, a topic to which we will return when
discussing the third pillar of the UNGPs.
The second issue, as discussed above, is that a SODR almost inevitably
will require the state to make budget cuts.124 The supposed justification for
these cuts, which all SODR participants understand will cause pain and adverse
human rights impacts, is that the society must accept some short term costs, in
order to restore a sustainable macro-economic situation and to position itself on
a sustainable growth path. This in turn is expected to generate future human
rights gains. Assuming that this justification is correct, it amounts to
concluding that it is acceptable to impose current human rights sacrifices in
order to reap future human rights gains. It is unclear how human rights law
should assess this inter-temporal human rights trade-off. Although, at a
minimum it should comply with the requirements that retrogressive measures
should be non-discriminatory, proportionate and should comply with the states
minimum core obligations.125 Evaluating this trade-off is further complicated by

122. In this regard it is interesting to note that the European Commission has done a social
impact assessment of the stability support programme for Greece. See European Commission,
Assessment of the Social Impact of the new Stability Support Programme for Greece, Commission Staff
Working Document, SWD(2015) 162 final (Aug 19, 2015).
123. It is interesting to note that Iceland made an effort to understand the human rights impacts
of its proposed SODR during its 2008 banking crisis. See Report of the Independent Expert on the
effects of foreign debt and other related international financial obligations of States on the full
enjoyment of all human rights, particularly economic, social and cultural rights on his mission to
Greece, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/31/60/Add.2 (Feb 29, 2016).
124. The extent of these cuts will be influenced by its ability to identify new sources of
financial support. Many debtor states will obtain such support from the IMF and multilateral
development banks.
125. See General Comment 3 of the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, supra
note 118; Goldmann, supra note 18.
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the fact that the current human rights costs can be assessed with reasonable
certainty but the future human rights benefits are uncertain and their scope and
scale depend on the assumptions made about the likely future trajectory of the
SODR and its impacts. In addition, the identity of the current losers can be
determined with a reasonable degree of confidence but the identity of the future
winners is less easily established. Moreover, there is no necessary reason to
assume that the future gainers will be the current losers. This is particularly
relevant because in the context of SODRs, human rights impacts in fact are
likely to be cumulative, that is, for example, current cuts in education spending
can have adverse impacts on the future health of the adversely affected learners
and can have negative impacts on their job prospects. There is no obvious
reason to assume that these currently adversely affected learners will benefit
from future increases in education spending.
2. The Second Pillar: The Responsibility of Financial Institutions
The UNGPs stipulate that business enterprises have a responsibility to
respect the human rights of those actually or potentially affected by their
operations or business relations. It clarifies that the core of this obligation is for
the business enterprise to engage in sufficient due diligence to identify the
human rights impacts of its planned operations and to take steps to prevent or
mitigate the adverse impacts.
This standard suggests that the creditor financial institutions have a
responsibility to undertake a HRIA before engaging with the sovereign debtor
about the SODR. In addition, they should continue updating the HRIA during
the SODR negotiations, and when it is concluded and is being implemented. As
in the case of the sovereign debtor, the financial institutions are expected to
undertake this HRIA under considerable time constraints and in conditions in
which complying with high standards of detailed analysis, transparency and
participation will be difficult if not impossible. Furthermore, as in the case of
the sovereign, this situation places a premium on the need for providing those
adversely affected by the SODR with access to remedies.
It is clear from the literature on HRIAs that they are still a relatively new
form of impact assessment and that practitioners are still working out the best
way to do such assessments.126 Nevertheless, there are certain characteristics
that should feature in any HRIA that complies with the UNGPs. Each of these
is discussed below together with the issues they raise in the context of SODRs.
It is well understood that in all impact assessments it is necessary to have
a sense of the human rights conditions that exist before the parties enter into
their transaction or operation. In principle, this should not be a problem
126. ISO 26000 supra note 14; Danish Institute for Human Rights, supra note 99; Oxfam
Technical Briefing, A Oxfam Perspective on the UN Guiding Principles (2013), available at
https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/tb-business-human-rights-oxfam-perspective-unguiding-principles-130613-en.pdf; Oxfam & FIDH, Community-Based Human Rights Impact
Assessment:
The
Getting
it
Right
Tool
(2011),
available
at
https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/cobhra_training_manual.pdf; DANISH INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACT ASSESSMENT – GUIDANCE AND TOOLBOX (2016), available at
http://www.humanrights.dk/sites/humanrights.dk/files/media/dokumenter/business/hria_toolbox/hria_gu
idance_and_toolbox_final_feb2016.pdf.
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because, pursuant to the UNGPs, the financial institutions and the sovereign
borrower should have done HRIAs before they entered into their original debt
transactions and they should be monitoring the impacts over the life of the
transaction. In this case, they would have a good sense of the existing human
rights situation before commencing the SODR. However, in reality, at least
while the HRIAs requirement is still relatively new, it is unlikely that the
parties have done HRIAs for all their financial transactions.
Even if the creditors had done HRIAs of their individual transactions with
the borrower, it is unlikely that they would have gathered information on the
cumulative impacts of all the debtor’s financial transactions. This is because
they may not have been involved in all the transactions and so would not have
done, ab initio, studies indicating how the impacts of the various transactions
interact with each other, either to reduce or increase over time the adverse
human rights impacts. Thus, they are unlikely to be in a position on their own
to make a truly informed judgement about the likely human rights impacts of
the SODR. If one looks at cases of recent SODRs, such as Greece,127 it is clear
that the cumulative impacts of these multiple agreements can be substantial. In
addition, it is clear that understanding them is a pre-condition for assessing the
likely impacts of an SODR. This suggests that there will be a need for the
creditors and the debtor to cooperate in undertaking the SODR HRIA.
In the event that the parties do not have a good baseline study, they will
be confronted with a complicated human rights challenge. Both parties will
know that they are undertaking a transaction that is likely to adversely impact
the human rights of at least some of the debtor’s subjects but without a clear
understanding of the scope and scale of the impacts or how they may interact
with each other. They may also not have the information to determine which of
the possible SODR outcomes would be the least harmful option for all the
affected stakeholders. Moreover, they will lack the time to undertake the kinds
of studies that might help them understand the impacts. The net effect is that
they will enter into the SODR with imperfect knowledge about the human
rights implications of their proposed actions and in conditions in which they
cannot easily take the public into their confidences about the proposed
transaction.
The conclusion to be drawn from this situation is not that it is too difficult
to apply the UNGPs to SODR. Rather, it is that the UNGPs need to be applied
pragmatically. The parties should do the best HRIA that is feasible under the
circumstances, understanding that they are unlikely to meet HRIA best practice
standards.
The situation is further complicated by the fact that the outcome of the
SODR will be a negotiated solution that will depend to a large extent on the
negotiating dynamics and the balance of bargaining power between the state
and its creditors. This means that neither the state nor the creditors can fully
assess the impacts of the SODR before an agreement is concluded. They will
not be able to determine, with any degree of confidence the full range, scale or

127. Truth Committee on Greek Public Debt, supra note 2; Salomon & De Schutter, supra note
2.
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scope of all the impacts until they have a clear understanding of how much the
debtor will have to pay, over what period and subject to what conditions.
Consequently, their initial ex ante assessments will be more in the nature of a
list of likely human rights impacts, without detailed information on the scale of
the impact. This assessment will need to be adjusted as their negotiations
proceed toward the final deal. The factors that will influence their assessment
of the human rights impact of the SODR outcome include the size of the budget
cuts the debtor will have to make, over what period, what external support may
be available to help deal with these cuts, how this may change over time, and
what measures the adversely affected stakeholders can take to counter the
effects of the cuts. This information will also allow them to more confidently
assess the trajectory of the adverse human rights impacts over time.
It is important to note that the HRIA needs to evaluate the impact of any
proposed SODR on all relevant stakeholders and to assess whether the overall
impact of the transaction on all these stakeholders is the least harmful from a
human rights perspective. This suggests that there will be some situations
where the financial institutions are contemplating transactions that may have
irreconcilable, in human rights terms, impacts. For example if they pay too
much attention to those adversely affected in the debtor country and take too
generous steps to prevent or mitigate their harm, they may end up unduly
impacting the interests of some bondholders, such as pensioners that count on
the interest they earn as holders of the debtor’s bonds for their monthly income.
This suggests that, at least in some cases, SODR is a zero-sum game and that in
making their HRIA assessments, the financial institutions will need to assess
how this game evolves over the life of the SODR.
Needless to say, the parties’ assessment of these outcomes over this
period will depend on the assumptions they make about the relative severity of
the impacts on the different stakeholders, and the reactions of the affected
persons. In addition, their estimate of the human rights impacts will be affected
by their assumption about the time period over which the impacts will manifest
themselves. If they assume too short a time horizon they may over-estimate
certain adverse human rights impacts which manifest themselves immediately
after the SODR is concluded and may under-estimate certain mitigating factors
relating to these impacts that manifest themselves more slowly. Conversely
they may under-estimate the actual adverse impacts if they do not allow
sufficient time to assess how the adverse impacts interact with each other and
to determine their cumulative impacts. This means that certain possible SODR
outcomes could be seen as being more or less desirable depending on the time
horizon used in the impact assessment.
These issues and the complexities of applying the first two pillars of the
UNGPs in the context of SODR, underscores the importance of the third pillar
for dealing with the grievances that are likely to arise in the context of the
implementation of the SODR.
3. The Third Pillar: Access to Remedies
As indicated above, there are substantial constraints on the ability of both
the state and the creditors to undertake effective due diligence in advance of
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agreeing a SODR. Consequently, there is a strong likelihood that there will be
stakeholders whose interests have not been adequately accounted for in the
HRIA of the outcome of the SODR. According to the UNGPs they should be
given access to either judicial or non-judicial forums in which they can seek a
remedy for this situation.128 Clearly in many cases, these stakeholders may, in
principle, be able to bring their grievance to a judicial or administrative forum
either in the debtor state or in one of the home states of the creditors. However,
this can be expensive, time consuming and the result can be uncertain.
Consequently, it is not clear if, in all cases, judicial forums will be able to offer
adequate effective relief to all those stakeholders whose human rights have
been adversely affected by the SODR.
This suggests that in many SODRs there will be a need for aggrieved
parties to have access to some form of SODR-specific grievance mechanism.
The UNGPs stipulates that these mechanisms should be legitimate, accessible,
predictable, equitable, transparent, rights compatible, and a source of
continuous learning by the company.129 The UNGPs also suggest that in setting
up the mechanism, the parties should consult affected stakeholders on its
performance and design.130 Subject to these criteria, the parties are free to
design and operate a grievance mechanism that best suits their purposes.
A SODR-specific grievance mechanism offers the sovereign debtor and
its creditors three benefits. First, it provides the parties with a relatively
flexible, informal and independent third party dispute settlement forum. Thus,
an aggrieved party, provided they meet its access requirements, can use the
mechanism to have their claim for a remedy for the human rights harm caused
by the SODR addressed by someone other than the debtor or the creditor. If the
process is transparent and participatory, it should give claimants confidence
that their claims have been fairly addressed and thus enable them to accept
even an unfavorable outcome of the grievance mechanism procedure. This fact
should also help boost public confidence in the responsiveness of the debtor
and the creditors to the interests of all stakeholders in the SODR. This can help
build support for the agreement amongst all stakeholders, thereby building
confidence in the ability of the parties to implement the agreement.
Second, this is a mechanism for dealing with the unintended adverse
human rights impacts of the SODR. Since these agreements will have been
concluded under time pressure and in the context of a crisis, there is a
probability that the parties to it will not take account of all relevant stakeholder
interests. As a result, there is a reasonable chance that the agreement will have
some unintended but adverse human rights impacts on some stakeholders. An
operational level grievance mechanism offers these stakeholders a means for
informing the debtor and creditor about these impacts before they become too
severe. It also provides a way for the affected parties and the debtor and
creditors to have a relatively independent third party deal with them on their
merits. This can help reduce the risk that the unaddressed concern becomes

128. Id.
129. Principle 31, UNGPs, supra note 11.
130. Id.
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politicized and a potential threat to the overall efficacy of the agreement.
Third, a grievance mechanism, as indicated in the UNGPs, can perform a
useful lessons learned function. The reason is that the mechanism generates
empirical data about the actual impacts of SODR agreements and about how
they can most effectively be managed. This may be of greater benefit to the
creditors, many of whom are likely to have to deal with SODRs in the future,
than to the sovereign debtor—who no doubt hopes not to have to repeat the
SODR experience.
The benefits of the grievance mechanism are offset by two costs. First,
the mechanism costs money to establish and maintain. An additional possible
cost can arise if the grievance mechanism can provide compensation to parties
that have been particularly severely affected by the SODR.
The question is who should be responsible for providing these funds—the
debtor or the creditor? The answer to this question can have human rights
implications. For example, if the debtor has to contribute the funds, it will have
to cut its budget somewhere else, which may lead to such adverse impacts as
job losses, reduced access to health care, education or social security for some
citizens or reduced access to the justice system. On the other hand, if the
creditor provides the funds, it might provide less debt relief to the debtor,
which could also result in adverse human rights impacts.
Given, as indicated above, that the mechanism provides benefits to both
the debtor and the creditor, it seems reasonable to expect both parties to
contribute to the cost of the grievance mechanism. This would also have the
benefit of enhancing the impression that the mechanism is impartial and
independent.
A second potential challenge is that the mechanism could be overwhelmed, if individuals are allowed to bring complaints to the mechanism. This
concern can be addressed through the jurisdictional requirements for the
mechanism. For example, it could require cases to be brought by groups of
individuals or organizations representing groups of individuals who have all
been adversely affected in the same way. Such a requirement would also help
the mechanism identify the most substantial and urgent complaints, thereby
assisting it in allocating its time and resources efficiently and in optimizing its
positive human rights impact on the SODR transaction.
The above discussion suggests that, on balance, the grievance mechanism
offers more advantages than disadvantages to the SODR. This impression
follows from the fact that the downsides of the mechanism, while not
insignificant, can be effectively managed by the debtor and the creditors.
Moreover, as the discussion of Pillars 1 and 2 of the UNGPs shows, there is a
substantial risk that neither the creditors nor the debtor will be able to fully
meet their/its responsibilities or obligations under the relevant pillar of the
UNGPs in the context of a sovereign debt crisis. Consequently, they will
benefit from having an independent, channel through which qualifying
grievances can be addressed efficiently and fairly.
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VI. SODRS AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE131
The above discussion suggests that there are gaps in global economic
governance relating to SODRs. The problem is not just that there is not a third
party mechanism for coordinating and enforcing sovereign debt workouts. It is
also that different aspects of the sovereign debt issue are being dealt with in
different parts of the institutional architecture of global economic governance
and they are not communicating effectively with each other.
Thus, the procedural issues of SODR are being deal with on an ad hoc
basis and in arrangements established by the parties. “Procedural” in this
context refers to the arrangements for the negotiations between the debtor and
creditors in an SODR. It includes such issues as the sharing of information and
how the parties should conduct themselves in these negotiations. It does not
include “substantive” issues such as the principles that should guide the parties
in deciding how to share the costs and benefits of the SODR among all the
stakeholders in the negotiation, and how to account to those stakeholders who
are adversely affected by the SODR for how they have been affected by the
SODR. As this article indicates, the IIF and UNCTAD have developed some
standards that seek to establish some principles to guide the SODR process.132
However, they focus on procedural concerns and do not deal in any detail with
the substantive issues that are likely to arise in SODRs.
The substantive issues that can arise in SODRs can be divided into two
categories. The first category consists of the economic and financial issues that
need to be addressed in order to reach a sustainable outcome. These are usually
dealt with by the parties through negotiation, although the IMF and possibly
some of the multilateral development banks may play a role in facilitating
agreement on these issues. At times, other international institutions may play a
role. For example, the Bank for International Settlement has provided support
in a number of SODRs,133 and the European Commission and the European
Central Bank have played a role in the SODRs of Greece, Portugal, Ireland and
Spain.134
The second category consists of the social and political, including human
rights, issues that arise in SODRs that will influence the sustainability of the
SODR outcomes. Formally these issues are considered to be the prerogative of
the sovereign debtor. This means that the sovereign is responsible for making
the difficult choices about how to allocate, inter alia, the human rights costs of
the SODR. However, as indicated above, de facto, it is untenable to maintain
that the creditors and international financial institutions such as the IMF do not
play a role in these allocative decisions. Moreover, in general terms, the
131. It is clear that this is a complex topic that cannot be discussed in any great detail in this
paper. Consequently, this section will focus on how to promote a more integrated and holistic approach
to the development of international standards applicable to the economic, financial, human rights, social
and political aspects of SODRs and not on such global governance challenges as the creation of a
sovereign debt restructuring mechanism.
132. Supra notes 7 and 8.
133. Ugo Panizza, Federico Sturzenegger & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, The Economics and Law of
Sovereign Debt and Default, 47 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC LITERATURE 651 (2009).
134. Philip R. Lane, The European Sovereign Debt Crisis, 26 THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVES 49 (2012); Gianviti et al., supra note 18.
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international community through such instruments as the UNGPs, the Global
Compact and the OECD Guidelines has made clear that it thinks that
businesses, including financial institutions, have a responsibility to deal with
the human rights impacts of their operations. Nevertheless, in no case, to date,
has any sovereign debtor or its creditors expressly applied the international
standards applicable to business and human rights to a SODR, despite the fact
that some of the debtor states135 have endorsed the UNGPs and some of their
creditors have expressly acknowledged their human rights responsibilities.
The fact that these procedural and substantive standards appear to run in
parallel and appear not to intersect is problematic.136 At the level of the
individual debtor state, sovereign debt crises are experienced holistically by the
debtor country and its citizens. However, the fact that the international
standards like the IIF Principles are taken into consideration by the creditors
while international standards like the UNGPs are excluded from the SODR
negotiations means that the human rights aspects of the crisis are unlikely to
receive the same consideration as the economic and financial factors. The result
is an over-emphasis on economic and financial considerations and an underestimation of the human rights and other social impacts, to the detriment of the
overall efficacy and sustainability of the SODR.137
This situation is a symptom of a coordination gap in global governance
arrangements that allows these two strands of thinking about financial
interactions to operate in parallel rather than in communication with each other.
It is possible that this deficiency could be corrected if all states could agree on
one entity to which to delegate the responsibility to coordinate the development
of international standards dealing with economics and finance issues and social,
human rights and cultural matters. Such coordination would ensure that all
these factors are taken into account in processes, such as SODRs, that are
ultimately holistic in nature and are experienced as such by their stakeholders.
While this may result in a SODR process that is more complicated and in
negotiations between the debtor and creditor that are more difficult, it should
also ultimately result in outcomes that are more sustainable and seen as more
legitimate by all stakeholders.
The existence of this gap is intriguing given that the international
community recognized the need for coordination between economic and social,
including human rights, issues when it established the United Nations. The
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) was expected to play this
coordinating role.138 Unfortunately, time has demonstrated that the ECOSOC
135. The UNGPs were endorsed by consensus by all the member states of the U.N. Human
Rights
Council
in
2011.
For
a
list
of
the
participating
states,
see
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/Year20102011.aspx.
136. The one exception to this observation is the UNGA resolution on sovereign debt
restructuring, see supra note 26. However, it is too early to know if this resolution will have any impact
on SODRs. In addition, the principles are set out in very general terms which may make them difficult to
apply in a uniform way in different SODRs. Furthermore, history suggests that neither debtors nor
creditors look to the UNGA for guidance when engaged in SODRs.
137. Concern about the dangers of paying inadequate attention to the social and human rights
implications of SODRs was raised in Greece. See Truth Committee on Greek Public Debt, supra note 5;
ECtHR, Koufaki and Adedy v. Greece, supra note 5, para. 47.
138. U.N. Charter, Chapter X (Articles 61–72) (Oct 24, 1945), 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 993,
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has not been effective in playing this role.139 In addition, in the SODR context,
the participants in the coordinating mechanism cannot be limited, like the
ECOSOC, to states. As this article has shown, non-state actors, such as
financial institutions are necessary participants in SODRs and thus will need to
have access to any coordinating mechanism, if it is to be effective.
Consequently there is a need for a new coordinating mechanism that can assist
all relevant stakeholders in SODRs in ensuring that all the applicable
international standards are integrated into the SODR process. Given the general
complexities of SODRs and the lack of agreement on the need for an
independent third party mechanism capable of enforcing a SODR outcome, and
the range of considerations that should be taken into account in an SODR, it is
unlikely that agreement could be reached on establishing a coordinating
mechanism that has anything more than advisory powers. Nevertheless such an
advisory mechanism if it had sufficient expertise and credibility and a
sufficiently high profile, could play a useful informational role and could shift
the burden of justifying exclusion of either the procedural or the substantive
standards from an SODR onto those parties that are resistant to including both
sets of standards.
CONCLUSION
SODRs are complicated transactions. They involve multiple actors with
conflicting interests and agendas, sophisticated contractual arrangements;
multiple regulatory environments, complex economic, financial and political
contexts, and they need to be negotiated under time pressure. They usually
must be concluded in the glare of publicity even though there are limitations on
how transparent they can actually be if they are to be concluded relatively
promptly and effectively.
The sovereign debtor and its creditors, in addition to dealing with all
these factors, need to respond to the demands of at least some of the
stakeholders in the SODRs that their outcomes comply with the evolving
international norms dealing with the human rights responsibilities of businesses
and the international legal obligations of sovereign debtors in this regard. The
UNGPs offer the parties to the SODR, at least in those cases in which
commercial creditors are involved, a basis for showing that they are responding
to these demands and the applicable norms and standards. In practice this
requires the parties to undertake appropriate due diligence, usually in the form
of ex ante human rights impact assessments. However, as indicated above, in
the specific context of SODRs there is not sufficient time or possibly the
resources to fully apply the UNGP requirements, particularly in regard to due
diligence. This means that both parties will have to do as much due diligence as
is feasible under the circumstances. As a result, they will have to base their
decisions on partial knowledge both about current human rights conditions and
available at http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-x/; Goldmann, supra note 18; Sabine
Michalowski, Sovereign Debt and Social Rights–Legal Reflections on a Difficult Relationship, 8 HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 35 (2008).
139. Arguably the U.N. General Assembly is attempting to play this coordinating role in its
2015 resolution on sovereign debt principles. See supra note 26.
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the likely impact of the SODR on these conditions and the trajectory of these
impacts over the life of the SODR. Applying the UNGPs, will help the parties
deal with the risks arising from this situation by making sure that they are
aware of the human rights impacts of their proposed transaction. In addition,
their ability to manage these impacts will be enhanced if they implement the
UNGPs requirement to establish an SODR-specific grievance mechanism. This
mechanism can address complaints arising from the SODR that the parties may
not have anticipated and that cannot adequately be dealt with in the applicable
judicial and administrative forums.
There are three conclusions that follow from this complicated situation.
First, the fact that the international standards dealing with business and human
rights are not expressly taken into account in SODRs is problematic. It
increases the risk of the debtor and creditors agreeing a SODR outcome that
over-emphasizes economic and financial considerations and under-emphasizes
the human rights and other impacts of the SODR. This in turn increases the risk
that the SODR outcome will be sub-optimal and possibly distorted. This in turn
risks undermining the legitimacy and sustainability of the SODR.
Second, the application of the UNGPs to the context of SODR highlights
an important challenge for human rights laws. It shows that the way in which
human right issues arise in the context of specific business transactions pose
new conceptual challenges for human rights law. For example, it is not clear
that human rights law can give the parties adequate guidance in working out if
or under what conditions it is acceptable, from a human rights perspective, for
them to accept short term adverse human rights consequences for inherently
uncertain long term benefits. Human rights law may also not be able to assist
them to determine how far they should stretch the lines of causation in
assessing the cumulative impacts of the SODR. For example, if the SODR is
shown to have an adverse effect on access to education, should the human
rights impact assessment consider the likely consequences of the reduced
access to education on the future employment, health, social welfare and other
rights of the children who lose access to education and their families? Human
rights law may also not be able to guide them in assessing how to balance the
competing claims of different stakeholders in a SODR. For example, it may not
be able to guide the creditors in deciding if they should attach greater priority to
the adverse impacts on the people who lose their jobs in the debtor country
because of the SODR, the people who lose access to health care because of cuts
in the health budget in the debtor country or the individual bondholders in a
second country who relied on the representations of the debtor country to
purchase its debt and now could lose part of their life savings or have their
monthly incomes cut if the debtor receives debt relief.
This conclusion makes clear that while the norms and standards in regard
to business and human rights are well established in the sense that there is
general consensus that businesses have human rights responsibilities, we are
still only in the early stages of developing our knowledge about how human
rights should be applied to businesses and how they should go about fulfilling
their human rights responsibilities. We are also only beginning to learn how
states should help businesses fulfill these responsibilities and how this will
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affect the human rights obligations of states. These are all issues that are in
need of further research.
The third conclusion relates to global economic governance. This article
suggests that there is a cost to be paid for treating the various international
standards applicable to the process of SODR in isolation from the standards
applicable to the substantive issues that arise in SODR, such as human rights
impacts. These different standards need to interact with each and their
application in specific contexts need to be coordinated to ensure that they
operate in a mutually supportive fashion. This suggests that there is a need for
an independent coordinating mechanism that can promote more effective
coordination between the actors developing these two parallel strands of
international norms and standards. Determining the precise nature, powers and
make up of this mechanism requires further research.

